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ABSTRACT
Industrial robots have been increasingly used for decades and the
International Federation of Robotics predicts that 1.3 million more of such
humanoids will be installed in factories across the globe between 2015 and
2018. While robots are deemed beneficial for industrial production, they
pose a serious threat to our health and safety. Robots have killed many
people and gravely injured numerous others in different countries.
Policymakers around the world remain largely unmoved about resolving the
uncertainty over the specificity of which persons should go on trial for such
killings. This Article examines the principles of common law governing
manslaughter by criminal negligence with particular reference to Australia;
however, it will generally apply to other common law countries as well. It
finds that while it would be theoretically possible to identify the potential
accused of workplace deaths caused by robots, we consider that the common
law identification doctrine in practice will be a bar to successful
prosecutions against corporate employers given the specific complexities
associated with the usage of industrial robots. This Article therefore submits
a recommendation with justifications for dealing with this serious offence by
enacting appropriate manslaughter law for the effective regulation of robotprovoked fatalities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A 2015 report of the Foundation for Responsible Robotics (FRR)
reveals that there are 1.5 million industrial robots and 12 million service
sector robots presently employed across the globe.1 A total of 229,261
industrial robots (IRs, and IR in singular) were sold in 2014 alone breaking
all the previous records and evidencing an increase of 29% from 2013, while
about 1.3 million more of such humanoids are expected to be installed in
factories across the globe between 2015 and 2018.2 Currently, markets have
a strong demand for “robust, flexible and efficient robots with a certain level
of autonomy.”3 It can be reasonably anticipated that our daily life in many
respects will be pervaded by “sophisticated robots” which will possess much
higher autonomy, intelligence and interconnectivity in the future compared
to their present equivalents.4 These robots will generally be large and capable
of assaulting humans around them causing deaths and injuries, as they have
already started doing so in many countries, and such incidents warrant legal
redress.5 Over the past 30 years, robots have killed at least 26 people in the
workplace in the United States alone.6 Perhaps more alarmingly, the United
Kingdom has witnessed 77 accidents in 2005 alone in which “people have
been crushed, hit on the head, welded and even had molten aluminium poured
over them by robots.”7 On June 29, 2015, a 22-year-old worker at a
Volkswagen factory in Frankfurt was killed by a stationary robot while he

1
Clive Cookson, Scientists Appeal for Ethical Use of Robots, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 10,
2015), https://www.ft.com/content/fee8bacc-9f37-11e5-8613-08e211ea5317.
2
Industrial Robot Statistics, INT’L FED’N OF ROBOTICS, http://www.ifr.org/industrial-robots/
statistics/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2015).
3
Tomislav Stipancic, Bojan Jerbic & Petar Curkovic, A Context-Aware Approach in Realization
of Socially Intelligent Industrial Robots, 37 ROBOTICS & COMPUTER ANIMATED MANUFACTURING 79, 79
(2016).
4
F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation, 66
FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1806 (2014).
5
Id.
6
Justin Huggler, Robot Kills Man at Volkswagen Plant in Germany, THE TELEGRAPH (July 2,
2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11712513/Robot-kills-man-atVolkswagen-plant-in-Germany.html.
7
Rick Noack, A Robot Killed a Factory Worker in Germany. So Who Should Go On Trial?, WASH.
POST (July 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/07/02/a-robot-killeda-factory-worker-in-germany-so-who-should-go-on-trial/.
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was trying to set it up.8 Conceivably, they will continue to cause harm
alongside providing benefit to us.
Workplace efficiency is important; however, more important is
workers’ safety. There is little dispute from a practical perspective that
liability incentivizes safety,9 which is why Occupational Health and Safety
(OHS) laws aim to set forth strict regulations worldwide. The issue at hand
is directly related to OHS entailing regulation, which needs to be appropriate,
clear, rational and effective in terms of protecting humans while we are
approaching a society where humans will coexist with humanoids including
IRs.10
The facts and figures about IRs signal a future trend towards employing
these humanoids across industries. This begs an effective resolution of
existing and potential disputes as to the criminal liability for manslaughter
arising out of workplace deaths caused by robots. While searching for
persons to be liable for such deaths, this Article does not intend to delve into
the debate of robots’ legal personhood;11 rather it endorses the view that
robots are a kind of product—“more precisely, artefacts created by human
design and labour, for the purpose of serving identifiable human needs,” and
therefore are an object of law rather than a subject.12 The legal science world
currently (and consistently) regards robots as no more than “innocent agents
or simple instruments of an individual’s mens rea.”13 Conferring personhood
on software agents like robots “does not seem at present necessary or even
opportune.”14 Moreover, it does not seem socially desirable to punish robots
instead of the humans behind them who contribute to committing the offence.

8
Kukil Bora, Volkswagen German Plant Accident: Robot Grabs, Crushes Man to Death, INT’L
BUS. TIMES (July 2, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/volkswagen-german-plant-accident-robot-grabscrushes-man-death-1993475.
9
Andrea Bertolini, Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic Applications
and Liability Rules, 5(2) LAW, INNOVATION & TECH. 214, 245 (2013). For a detailed discussion of why
robots are to be treated as products for liability purposes, see id. at 236–39.
10
It should be noted that Australian current OHS legislation excludes manslaughter liability
provisions.
11
The debate of robots’ legal personality has been addressed separately: see S.M. Solaiman, Legal
Personality of Robots, Corporations, Idols and Chimpanzees: A Quest for Legitimacy, 25 ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. (forthcoming 2017).
12
Bertolini, supra note 9, at 235.
13
UGO PAGALLO, THE LAWS OF ROBOTS—CRIMES, CONTRACTS, AND TORTS 69 (2013).
14
Giovanni Sartor, Cognitive Automata and the Law: Electronic Contracting and the Intentionality
of Software Agents, 17(4) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 253, 283 (2009).
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Robots may not be legally accountable under penal law in the foreseeable
future, as “they lack the set of preconditions” for criminal liability.15
In 1937, Lord Atkin in Andrews v. DPP defined “manslaughter” which
is now applied to corporations and called “corporate manslaughter.”16 The
offence is obviously committed by a human agent, but it is attributed to
corporation due to a specific relationship between such an agent and
corporation. Besides regulatory offences (quasi-crimes), a corporation can
only be held liable when the offence is virtually committed by individuals
who manage and control, and thereby embody, the company.17
Manslaughter is not a crime of intent, rather more an offence of
recklessness or negligence. The conduct of robots causing human deaths
affects the fundamental concepts of criminal law, such as culpability
warranting punishment.18 This research chiefly looks for the manslaughter
liability of the employer of the victim (the employer) and its officers
(together, “the user side”) under criminal law from the viewpoint of OHS.
However, brief references to the liability of the user side under OHS and civil
laws and the civil liability of the supply side of robots will also be made
where appropriate.
Part II briefly discusses robots, corporations and corporate criminal
liability. Part III analyses the definitions and constituting elements of
manslaughter by criminal negligence (MCN) under the principles of common
law and statutory laws as applicable in New South Wales (NSW), a leading
common law jurisdiction in Australia. Part IV endeavours to identify the
persons who should go on trial for deaths caused by robots at the workplace
in light of the legal principles analysed in the preceding Part III. Finally, Part
V presents conclusions.
II. ROBOTS, CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
There is no universally accepted definition of the word “robot,” which
originated in a 1921 science-fiction play titled R.U.R., when it used the

15

See PAGALLO, supra note 13, at 48, for the reasons in some detail.
(1937) 2 All ER 552, 554–55, as cited in Melanie Pritchard, Corporate Manslaughter: The
Drawing of a New Era?, 27 HONG KONG L.J. 40, 54 & n.94 (1997).
17
AMANDA PINTO & MARTIN EVANS, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 35 (3d ed. 2013).
18
PAGALLO, supra note 13, at 49.
16

Vol. 35, No. 1 (2016) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2016.117 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu

2016]

CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER BY INDUSTRIAL ROBOTS AT WORK 25

Czech word “robota,” meaning “heavy labor.”19 The word “robota” now
refers to “machines.”20 Oxford Dictionary defines robot as a machine that can
do some tasks that a human can do and that works automatically or is
controlled by a computer.21 The International Organisation for
Standardization (ISO) defines “robot” by ISO8373, which describes it as an
“automatically controlled, reprogrammable, multipurpose manipulator
programmable in three or more axes, which may be either fixed in place or
mobile for use in industrial automation applications.”22 Modern sophisticated
robots are complex products, as exemplified by their five characteristics.
These are: “size,” “mobility,” “connectivity” (meaning that they can
communicate information), “autonomy” (recognising their physical ability to
independently respond to external input), and “intelligence” (referring to “the
rate at which the machine can receive, evaluate, use, and transmit
information, and the extent, if any, to which it can learn from experience and
use this learning in determining future responses”).23 Robots are programmed
to perform certain tasks and are designed in a way to achieve the desired
result most effectively. In sum, robots are machines that have some degree
of autonomy and artificial intelligence to act like humans in specific areas of
human labour depending upon their programming. Hence, we definitely
recognise the ability of IRs to cause harm including injuring and killing
humans around them at work. The cause and source of such an ability is the
main concern of this Article.
A “corporation” initially emerged as an association of humans.24
However, while corporations may now be comprised of a single individual,
such organisations still need to be corporatised under certain laws in order to

19

Hubbard, supra note 4, at 1806 n.1.
Id.
21
A.S. HORNBY, OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER’S DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 1107
(Joanna Turnbull et al. eds., 8th ed. 2010).
22
INT’L FED’N OF ROBOTICS, supra note 2. It also provides meanings of the words used in the
definition: Reprogrammable: whose programmed motions or auxiliary functions may be changed without
physical alterations; Multipurpose: capable of being adapted to a different application with physical
alterations; Physical alterations: alteration of the mechanical structure or control system except for
changes of programming cassettes, ROMs, etc. Axis: direction used to specify the robot motion in a linear
or rotary mode. Id.
23
Hubbard, supra note 4, at 1807.
24
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
20
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obtain legal personhood.25 A company, in legal concept, can be defined as
“an entity created by law conferring artificial personality to represent
individuals who operate it for profits or other purposes with perpetuity in its
existence and simplicity in its contractual relations.”26 Pinto and Evans
describe a corporation as “merely [a] creature of statute without human
characteristics governed by a series of rules.”27 Some enlightened
descriptions were provided in an early British corporate law case,28 which
was concerned with the concept of “control” and “enemy character” of a
company. In Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. v. Daimler Co., Lord Reading
CJ pronounced that the fact of incorporation was not just a “technicality.” He
stated that:
[A company] is a living thing with a separate existence which cannot be swept
aside as a technicality. It is not a mere name or mask or cloak or device to conceal
the identity of persons and it is not suggested that the company was formed for
any dishonest or fraudulent purpose. It is a legal body clothed with the form
prescribed by the Legislature.29

In his dissenting judgement, Buckley LJ opined that:
The artificial legal person called the corporation has no physical existence. It
exists only in contemplation of law. It has neither body, parts, nor passions. It
cannot wear weapons nor serve in the wars. It can be neither loyal nor disloyal. It
cannot compass treason. It can be neither friend nor enemy. Apart from its
corporators it can have neither thoughts, wishes, nor intentions, for it has no mind
other than the minds of the corporators. These considerations seem to me essential
to bear in mind. . . .30

Replying to Governor Romney’s claim that corporations are people,
Elizabeth Warren, a Harvard Law Professor and United States Senator,
asserted that “[n]o, . . . corporations are not people. People have hearts. They
have kids. They get jobs. They get sick. They thrive. They dance. They live.

25

See, e.g., Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 114 (Austl.); Companies Act 2006, c. 2, § 123 (Eng.).
S.M. Solaiman, The Landmark James Hardie Case in Australia: A Wakeup Call for NonExecutive Directors, 34 COMPANY LAW 178, 178 (2013).
27
PINTO & EVANS, supra note 17, at 52.
28
Continental Tyre and Rubber Co., Ltd. v. Daimler Co., Ltd. [1915] 1 KB 893 (Gr. Brit.).
29
Id. at 904.
30
Id. at 916.
26

Vol. 35, No. 1 (2016) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2016.117 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu

2016]

CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER BY INDUSTRIAL ROBOTS AT WORK 27

They love. And they die. And that matters . . . because we don’t run this
country for corporations, we run it for people.”31
Even before all of the above assertions, Lord Chancellor Thurlow said
in the 18th century: “Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience,
when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?”32
All of these definitions and descriptions of robots and corporations
indisputably depict that robots and corporations are different, not only in the
eyes of law, but in fact. Nonetheless, there were and still are arguments
against the imposition of criminal sanctions on corporations.33 Despite such
oppositions, the corporate criminal liability is now widely recognised and
applied worldwide, exceptions apart;34 whereas robots’ legal personality is
yet to be conferred.
Although its criminal liability is recognised, a corporation cannot be
held responsible for certain crimes;35 however, it can be convicted of
manslaughter in common law,36 unless legislation provides otherwise. At the
same time, this liability can be imposed by legislation as well. Serving as
recent examples, the United Kingdom has enacted the Corporate
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007; plus, between February
2011 and November 2015, a total of 23 companies were convicted of
corporate manslaughter, and the trial of two others is currently underway.37
Similarly, all states and territories in Australia recognise corporate

31
Mark Karlin, Elizabeth Warren: People Have Hearts; Corporations Don’t, BUZZFLASH (Nov. 9,
2015), http://www.truth-out.org/buzzflash/commentary/elizabeth-warren-people-have-heartscorporations-don-t/11734-elizabeth-warren-people-have-hearts-corporations-don-t.
32
John C. Coffee, Jr., No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981).
33
For a justification of corporate criminal liability, see PAUL REDMOND, CORPORATIONS AND
FINANCIAL MARKETS LAW (6th ed. 2013).
34
As a fundamental principle of German law, Germany does not recognise corporate criminal
liability, although regulatory fines apply to corporations as an exception under section 30 of the Act on
Regulatory Offences. See Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten [Act on Regulatory Offences] Feb. 19, 1987,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, § 30 (Ger.).
35
For example, corporations cannot commit perjury or bigamy. See Presidential Security Services
of Australia Pty Ltd v Brilley [2008] NSWCA 204 (Austl.).
36
R v. P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd. (1991) 93 Cr App R 73 (Eng.); R v. HM Coroner for
East Kent, ex parte Spooner (1987) 88 Cr. App. R. 10 (UK); R v. ICR Haulage Ltd. (1944) 1 KB 551,
556; DAVID BROWN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAWS 792–94 (6th ed. 2015).
37
Corporate Manslaughter Case Tracker, FIELDFISHER (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.fieldfisher
.com/media/3694153/corporate-manslaughter-tracker.pdf [hereinafter FIELDFISHER].
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manslaughter liability, which Australian Capital Territory (ACT) has
incorporated in its criminal law legislation.38
In NSW, the penalty is prescribed in section 24 of the Crimes Act 1900,
while its section 19(1)(b) effectively leaves the definitions of manslaughter
to be determined by the judiciary, or, in other words, the common law.
Hence, NSW follows the common law definition of MCN, and we will
analyse that definition and apply it to the scenario involving IRs in order to
analyse when the employer corporation, its senior executives, and other
employees can be held responsible. Notably, the High Court of Australia
(HCA), the highest court of the country, confirmed in Hamilton v Whitehead
that the common law identification theory, to be discussed further below,
applies in Australia.39
Both corporations and individuals can be held liable for manslaughter.
However, corporations can theoretically be held liable for manslaughter in
all jurisdictions across Australia under the prevailing legal regimes, like
many other countries, while an individual’s liability for such a heinous
offence is recognised throughout the globe. This Article considers the
liability of both corporations and individuals in NSW, using the case law of
other jurisdictions where appropriate.
III. MANSLAUGHTER—DEFINITIONS AND CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS
An unlawful homicide is one of the most heinous offences in all
societies. Such homicides are categorised into murder and manslaughter.40
To simply distinguish between these two, murder is generally an intentional
and unlawful killing of another person without justification or a valid excuse,
whereas manslaughter is causing death of another person unintentionally or
intentionally with justification or a valid excuse.41 In some jurisdictions, such

38
See, e.g., Criminal Code (Qld) s 303; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 18(1)(b); Crimes Act 1900
(ACT) ss 49A–49E; Nydam v The Queen [1977] VR 430; Rick Sarre, Professor at University of South
Australia, Sentencing Those Convicted of Industrial Manslaughter, Address at the Sentencing Conference
6–7 (Feb. 6, 2010) (transcript, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ALRS/2010/1.html).
39
(1988) 166 CLR 121.
40
For example, of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 18 describes and distinguishes between “murder”
and “manslaughter.”
41
See, e.g., The Queen v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67 (Austl.); Lane v R [2013] NSWCCA 317
(Austl.); Grant v R [2014] NSWCCA 67 (Austl.).
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as Scotland and South Africa, manslaughter is called “culpable homicide.”42
Manslaughter can be an alternative verdict against a murder charge if the
elements of murder are not proved beyond reasonable doubt but those of
manslaughter are successfully made out instead.43 Manslaughter is
subcategorised into two; namely, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary
manslaughter, in which the word “voluntary” is attached to the accused’s act
that caused the victim’s demise.44 Compared to involuntary manslaughter,
voluntary manslaughter is more violent in that all of the physical and mental
elements of murder are satisfied. Nonetheless, the accused’s culpability is
downgraded to manslaughter because of successful reliance on a defence
called provocation or substantial impairment by abnormality of mind, or
excessive self-defence.45 Involuntary manslaughter in common law is again
subdivided into manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act (MUDA), and
manslaughter by criminal negligence (MCN). As the name itself suggests,
MUDA refers to an unintentional killing of another by an intentional or
voluntary act that is contrary to criminal law and dangerous as well.46 As
defined by the HCA in Wilson v R, a person commits MUDA “only where an
unlawful act gives rise to a belief on the part of a reasonable person that
someone is being exposed to an appreciable risk of serious injury.”47 In our
understanding of workplace deaths by robotic hands, MCN is more relevant
than MUDA. Thus, this Article explores MCN alone.
A. Manslaughter by Criminal Negligence
MCN is originally a creation of common law though later incorporated
into legislation in many jurisdictions.48 However, NSW still relies on case

42
Corporate Homicide and Corporate Manslaughter Act 2007, c. 19, § 1(5)(b) (Scot.); State v.
Pistorius 2014 (42) SA 3280 (CC) at 3317, 3330 (S. Afr.).
43
R v Downs (1985) 3 NSWLR 312 (Austl.).
44
See Wilson v R (1992) 174 313 (Austl.); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
45
See, e.g., Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 421 (Austl.); The Queen v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67
(Austl.); Lane v R [2013] NSWCCA 317 (Austl.); Grant v R [2014] NSWCCA 67 (Austl.).
46
Wilson v R (1992) 174 CLR 313, 335 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson, JJ., dissenting) (Austl.);
THALIA ANTHONY ET AL., WALLER & WILLIAMS CRIMINAL LAW: TEXT AND CASES 347 (12th ed. 2013).
47
BROWN ET AL., supra note 36, at 771.
48
See, e.g., Criminal Law Consolidated Act 1935 s 14 (S. Austl.); Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 18
(Austl.). See also Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59
(2005).
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law, as the crimes legislation does not provide any definition of this offence.
In the 1937 case Andrews v. DPP, Lord Atkin created the offence of
manslaughter, which NSW now applies to corporations.49 This means that
the offence of MCN, whether committed by a corporation or a natural person
as an individual, is exactly the same crime and is distinguished only by the
imputation of the latter’s (i.e., the individual’s) negligent conduct and mental
state to the former due to their existing relationship when it comes to
corporate manslaughter. Such an imputation is essential to convict the
company under the common law identification doctrine, also known as the
theory of directing mind or organic theory (these three names are used
interchangeably).50
The law of negligence can be traced back to 1883 when Brett MR, in
Heaven v. Pender, stated in dicta that “whenever one person is by
circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another . . . whereby
he may cause danger of injury . . . a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill
to avoid such danger.”51 However, the principles of modern negligence law
were articulated by the House of Lords in 1932 when the law of negligence
had embraced the neighbourhood principle formulated by Lord Atkin in
Donoghue v. Stevenson.52 The neighbourhood principle applies to ascertain
the existence of duty of care. The principle is that:
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure
your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? . . . You must
take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee
would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? . . .
persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably
to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind
to the acts or omissions which are called in question.53

Though originated in a civil suit, the House of Lords in R v. Adomako
held that the ordinary principles of the law of negligence governing civil
disputes apply to MCN in the determination of the existence of duty and the

49

Pritchard, supra note 16, at 54 (citing Andrews v. DPP (1937) 2 All ER 552 (HL) 554–55).
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass [1972] AC 153 (HL) 170.
51
(1883) 11 QBD 503, 509.
52
[1932] AC 562 (HL) (appeal taken from Scot.).
53
Id. at 580.
50
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breach thereof.54 Central to MCN is the existence of the common law duty of
care, which must be owed by the accused to the victim. The duty of care is
required to be legally enforceable although it may not be overtly imposed by
legislation, but a mere moral obligation is insufficient.55 The duty may exist
in various ways; it can be implied by law, stemmed from contract or certain
relationships, or voluntarily assumed.56
We adopt the elements of MCN as recently applied and analysed by the
New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal (NSWCCA) in the corporate
manslaughter case of Cittadini v R.57 It is pertinent to note that the English
Court of Criminal Appeal in R v. Bateman,58 a leading case involving MCN,59
set down a similar set of four requirements which have been reaffirmed by
the House of Lords in R v. Adomako.60 The four elements as directed by the
trial judge to the jury and later affirmed by the NSWCCA are as follows:
i.
Existence of duty of care: That the accused owed a duty of care to the
deceased.
ii.
Breach of duty of care by negligent conduct: That the accused was negligent
in that, he/she breached the duty of care by his/her act(s) or omission(s), meaning
he/she did something that a reasonable person in his/her position would not do or
he/she failed to do something that a reasonable person in his/her position would
have done.
iii. Grossly or wickedly negligent conduct: That the breach of duty fell so far
short of the standard of care that a reasonable person in his/her position would
have exercised, and it involved such a risk of death or serious bodily harm as to
constitute, ‘gross’ or ‘wicked’ negligence and be treated as criminal conduct.

54
[1994] UKHL 6 [1995] 1 AC (HL) 171, http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1994/6.html (last
visited May 29, 2013). For its application in Australian Law, see also Burns v The Queen (2012) 246 CLR
334; Cittadini v R [2009] NSWCCA 302.
55
See Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962); People v. Chapman, 28 N.W.
896, 898 (Mich. 1886).
56
See R v Russell [1933] VLR 59 (Austl.); R v. Stone & Dobinson (1977) 1 QB 354 (Eng.).
57
[2009] NSWCCA 302, ¶ 29.
58
(1925) 19 Cr. App. R. 8 (HL).
59
See The Law Reform Commission, CONSULTATION PAPER: INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER 91
(2007).
60
[1994] UKHL 6, [1995] 1 AC (HL) 171, [9], http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1994/6.html
(last visited May 29, 2013).
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iv. Causation: The act(s)/omission(s) of the accused caused the death of the
deceased.61

These four elements of MCN apply to both natural and artificial persons with
respect to criminal liability for workplace deaths in common law jurisdictions
unless statutes provide otherwise.62 A successful conviction calls for all of
the above four elements to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt.
B. Proving the Elements of MCN
1. Proving the Existence of a Duty of Care Owed to the Deceased
In order to facilitate the proof of existence of a duty of care, common
law has developed some established categories of relationships in which the
court shall presume that such a duty exists simply by virtue of those
relationships. They include, inter alia, the relationship between an employer
and its employees and that between a manufacturer and its consumers.63
Employers owe a duty of care to their employees,64 and an employer includes
both the corporation and its managing director or chief executive.65 The
employment relation is founded on a contract. Wright J in R v Pittwood held
that, with regard to a duty of care and a contractual relationship, it is
immaterial whether the duty is owed to the company as the employer or to
the victim, because a contractual duty in itself is a sufficient basis for criminal
liability to arise from omission irrespective of to whom the duty is owed.66
On the other hand, the modern law of negligence originated with the
recognition of manufacturer’s liability for personal injuries to potential users
of its products as was the issue and the decision thereon of the House of Lords

61

Cittadini v R [2009] NSWCCA 302, ¶ 29.
In the United Kingdom, the common law principles were applicable to both natural persons and
corporations until the enactment the Corporate Manslaughter and Homicide Act, 2007, c. 19, §§ 2(6), 20,
which aims to exclusively deal with corporate killings. So, corporate manslaughter is governed under this
legislation in the United Kingdom.
63
The relationship between manufacturers and their consumers is mentioned because references to
manufacturers’ civil liability will be made further below.
64
Kondis v State Transp Auth (1984) 154 CLR 672, ¶¶ 33–35 (Austl.); Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co.
v. English [1938] AC 57 (HL) (appeal taken from Scot.).
65
R v. DPP ex parte Jones [2000] Crim. L.R. 858, 859–60.
66
(1902) 19 TLR 37, 38.
62
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in Donoghue v. Stevenson.67 It is therefore clear in common law that both the
employer and the manufacturer owe a duty of care to their employees and
product users respectively.
Apart from this common law imposition of a duty of care, statutes may
ascribe such a duty to anyone, regardless of any relationship.68 In
circumstances in which neither common law nor statutes have defined the
existence of a duty of care, courts will determine the duty on a case-by-case
basis, which involves both a question of law and a question of fact. French
CJ of the HCA in Burns v The Queen pronounced that it is for the judge to
resolve the question of law whether a particular set of facts gives rise to a
duty of care, whilst the jury will decide the existence of those facts.69 So, the
liability of individuals who could be potentially liable for MCN apparently
committed by an IR would be judged separately in line with the relevant facts
surrounding the person and his/her disputed conduct in the light of the four
elements of MCN discussed above. However, the neighbourhood principle
arguably imposes a duty of care on all of the creators and users of the machine
so far as the requirements set forth in the principle as discussed earlier are
satisfied.70 Australian courts do follow this general principle approach to the
determination of the existence of a duty of care and related liabilities.71
It is worthy of mention that when robots are being made for commercial
purposes, any reasonable person involved in the making process must foresee
that any defects in the product will injure his/her “neighbour.” It is not
necessary that a particular victim’s injury be reasonably foreseeable—it is
sufficient that it is reasonably foreseeable that a class of persons could
potentially be harmed.72 Similarly, reasonable work supervisors must realise
that if any safety measures are required to be taken to avoid potential
accidents as might have been disclosed by the manufacturer with the product
or purchase documents, ignorance of such requirements may eventuate in
MCN.
67
[1932] AC 562 (HL) (appeal taken from Scot.). See also Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills [1935]
UKPC 2; Haynes v. Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146; Deyong v. Shenburn [1946] KB 227; Farr v. Butters
Bros. [1932] 2 KB 606.
68
See R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 22 (Austl.); Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
69
(2012) 246 CLR 334, ¶ 20 (citing R v Evans (Gemma) [2009] 1 WLR 1999 [2010] 1 All ER 13,
¶ 39).
70
See Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL) 580 (appeal taken from Scot.).
71
See Jaensch v Coffey (1983) 155 CLR 549.
72
See Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1979) 146 CLR 40, 49 per Mason J (Austl.).
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Therefore, we can argue that all individuals related to the creation and
operation of an IR along with the employer as well as the manufacturer owe
a duty of care to a potential victim of such a robot in the workplace. The
existence of a duty of care can thus be easily proved against both corporations
and individuals involved in the making and using of errant IRs.
2. Proving the Breach of a Duty of Care Owed to the Deceased
French CJ of the HCA in Burns v The Queen pronounced that no
liability, civil or criminal, arises at common law for negligence unless the
negligent conduct involves a breach of a duty of care owed to another.73 The
Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in 1977 gave a seminal verdict
in Nydam v R74 regarding the definition of MCN, which was subsequently
approved by the HCA in The Queen v Lavender75 and Burns v The Queen.76
As espoused in Nydam v R by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of
Victoria, establishing MCN requires the prosecution to prove that:
In order to establish manslaughter by criminal negligence, it is sufficient if the
prosecution shows that the act which caused the death was done by the accused
consciously and voluntarily, without any intention of causing death or grievous
bodily harm but in circumstances which involved such a great falling short of the
standard of care which a reasonable man would have exercised and which
involved such a high risk that death or grievous bodily harm would follow that the
doing of the act merited criminal punishment.77

The Court mentions only “the act,” which inherently includes “the
omission” with respect to MCN.78 When it comes to “an act” constituting
MCN, the action need not be unlawful, but must have been committed
negligently and voluntarily.79 An act will be regarded as voluntary if it is
subject to the control and discretion of the defendant.80 The voluntariness of
an act is unrelated to its consequence (in MCN, death); rather, it is sufficient

73

(2012) 246 CLR 334, ¶ 20.
[1977] VR 430, 445.
75
(2005) 222 CLR 67, ¶¶ 17, 60, 72, 136.
76
(2012) 246 CLR 334, ¶ 19 per French CJ.
77
[1997] VR 430, 445.
78
See supra note 55 and accompanying text, discussing the elements of MCN.
79
See R v Martin (1983) 32 SASR 419 (Austl.); R v Tajber [1986] FCA 459 (Austl.).
80
See Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 (Austl.); R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64 (Austl.);
R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 (Austl.).
74
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if the accused was conscious of the nature of the act causing the death of the
victim or another, and nonetheless chose to commit an act of that nature.81 A
lack of such consciousness or awareness of the nature of the act will render
the conduct involuntary; however, the most critical consideration is a lack of
exercise of the accused’s will power.82 The lack of exercise of will power
represents negligence in the conduct of the offence. So, in order to satisfy the
physical part of the offence, the prosecution will have to prove that the
accused committed the act or omission causing death in question without
exercising her will power in the circumstances where no defences can be
relied upon to avoid liability.
The conduct in breach of the duty needs to be without any intention of
causing death or grievous bodily harm,83 showing a great failure to act as a
reasonable person causing death of another that justifies criminal penalty (as
quoted above).84 To further clarify, the Court in Nydam v R refers to the
accused’s appreciation of the “probability” of death or serious bodily harm
that merits criminal punishment,85 and the HCA has implicitly approved this
in The Queen v Lavender,86 as mentioned above.87 “The existence of a
reasonably foreseeable risk to safety which is likely to result in serious injury
or death is a factor which will be relevant to the assessment of the gravity of
the offence,” while the degree of foreseeability will be considered in
assessing the level of the accused’s culpability.88
Further, regarding a breach of a duty of care by omission, the House of
Lords held in R v. Miller that a person may be held liable for homicide for
“failing to take measures that lie within one’s power to counteract a danger
that one has oneself created.”89 Again, it means a failure to exercise will
power. In DPP v Esso Australia Pty Ltd, the Supreme Court of Victoria
convicted the company and imposed the fine for two failures: failure to

81

R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 (Austl.); R v Williamson (1996) 67 SASR 428 (Austl.).
See Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205 per Barwick CJ (Austl.). See also R v Schaeffer
(2005) 13 VR 337 (Austl.).
83
This intention may render the offence murder.
84
Nydam v R [1997] VR 430, 445.
85
[1977] VR 430, as cited in DAVID BROWN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAWS—MATERIALS AND
COMMENTARIES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCESS OF NEW SOUTH WALES 466 (2011).
86
(2005) 222 CLR 67.
87
BROWN ET AL., supra note 85, at 466 (citing Cittadini v R [2009] NSWCCA 302).
88
Capral Aluminium Ltd v Workcover Auth of New South Wales (2000) 49 NSWLR 610, ¶ 81.
89
[1983] 2 AC 161 (HL) 176.
82
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conduct hazard identification, and failure to impart adequate training to its
employees about risks.90 For a workplace death, a company can be convicted
for both overt and hidden (latent) failures to prevent the incident.91 Covert
failures include design failures, insufficient training, and inadequate
supervision.92 The consequences of covert failures do not become apparent
immediately; rather, they are delayed and occur at a later time.93
Proving negligent conduct has always been a difficult issue.94 The
negligence that merits criminal sanction needs to be gross or wicked
negligence in exclusion of simple carelessness and the omission has to be
conscious and voluntary to commit MCN. In directing the jury in R v
Nicholls, Brett J described the high degree of negligence required as “wicked
negligence” meaning “negligence so great, that you must be of the opinion
that the prisoner had a wicked mind, in the sense that she was reckless and
careless whether the creature died or not.”95 Whether the accused’s conduct
was grossly or wickedly negligent is a question of fact.96 An objective test
applies to determine the grossness or wickedness of negligence,97 so also to
determine probability or foreseeability of the risk.98
When the defendant is a corporation, the gross negligent conduct will
be judged against the standard of care of a reasonable entity.99 The objective
test100 is not purely objective when it is applied to manslaughter offences—
when that is the case, it is effectively a hybrid test.101 Its objectivity is
somewhat diminished in that, in order to assess whether the disputed breach

90
91

[2001] VSC 263; BROWN ET AL., supra note 85, at 477.
See Celia Wells et al., Disasters: A Challenge for the Law, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 496, 499–501

(2000).
92
93

JAMES REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF ORGANISATIONAL ACCIDENTS 10 (1997).
R.B. WHITTINGHAM, PREVENTING CORPORATE ACCIDENTS—AN ETHICAL APPROACH 11

(2008).
94

See, e.g., R v AC Hatrick Chemicals Pty Ltd (1995) 152 A Crim R 384 (Austl.).
(1875) 13 Cox CC 75, 76 (Austl.).
96
Ron Craig, Manslaughter as a Result of Workplace Fatalities 4–5 (1996), http://
freepdfdb.com/pdf/manslaughter-as-a-result-of-workplace-fatality-32108639.html.
97
High Court of Australia in The Queen v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67, and the Supreme Court
of NSW in R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226.
98
Workcover v Brandown Pty Ltd [2015] NSWDC 261, ¶ 23.
99
Jonathan Clough, A Glaring Omission? Corporate Liability for Negligent Manslaughter, 20
AUSTRL. J. LAB. L. 29, 51 (2000).
100
The Queen v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67, ¶ 14.
101
Id.
95
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occurred, as the NSWCCA in R v Cornelissen pronounced, the jury must be
directed that the reasonable person under the objective test should be placed
in the accused’s position.102 The HCA, in The Queen v Lavender, explained
that the objective test contemplates:
a reasonable person who possesses the same personal attributes as the accused,
that is to say a person of the same age, having the same experience and knowledge
as the accused and the circumstances in which he found himself, and having the
ordinary fortitude and strength of mind which a reasonable person would
have . . . .103

Consistently, explaining the meaning attributing accused’s characteristics to
the reasonable person, the New South Wales Supreme Court (NSWSC) most
recently held in R v Thomas that the reasonable person shall be attributed the
awareness and knowledge of the circumstances of the act causing victim’s
death.104 The Court further adds as “objectively ascertainable attribute[s]”
that the accused’s age105 or a moderate or extreme intellectual disability can
also be taken into account in determining whether the reasonable person in
the accused’s position would have realised that the act involved risks.106
In The Queen v Lavender, the HCA provided further clarity to the
objective test:
If there had been some particular fact or circumstance which the [accused] knew,
or thought he knew and which contributed to that opinion, and the jury had been
informed of that, and the counsel had asked for a direction about it, then it may
have been appropriate to invite the jury to take that into account.107

Therefore, to constitute a breach, the negligent conduct must be grossly or
wickedly negligent—a question of fact108 which must be proven by relying
on an objective test.109 However, foregoing judicial decisions dictate that the
objective test is significantly influenced by the subjective elements of the
accused. To minimise this subjectivity, the House of Lords ruled that there is

102
[2004] NSWCCA 449, ¶¶ 82–83. The Court relied upon the dicta ordained in Wilson v The
Queen (1992) 174 CLR 313, 334.
103
(2005) 222 CLR 67, ¶ 14.
104
[2015] NSWSC 537, ¶¶ 41, 71.
105
DPP (Vic) v TY (2006) 167 A Crim R 596, ¶ 12.
106
R v Thomas [2015] NSWSC 537, ¶ 69.
107
(2005) 222 CLR 67, ¶ 59.
108
Craig, supra note 96, at 5.
109
The Queen v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67, ¶ 59; R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226.

Vol. 35, No. 1 (2016) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2016.117 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu

38

JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 35:21

no need that the accused realised the risk of death or serious bodily harm to
the victim or another as long as a sober and reasonable person would have so
realised.110 The HCA echoed this view, holding that the Crown is not required
to prove the accused’s subjective appreciation that “he was being negligent
or that he was being negligent to such a high degree.”111 All of these reinforce
the exceedingly high degree of negligence that must be proven in order to
convict an accused of MCN—the mere appreciation of risk will not suffice.
When the offence is committed by an individual, the breach of a duty of
care by the required degree of negligence has to be proved directly against
the accused natural person. With respect to a breach by a company that
involves an IR, the breach has to be committed by one or more of the
potentially liable natural persons from the user side when it comes to
workplace safety.112 Once the breach by an individual has been proved, the
prosecution bears the onus to further prove in order to convict a corporation
that the breach was committed by the directing mind and will (DM) of the
company in accordance with the identification doctrine.113 This has generally
been a challenging part in a prosecution of corporate manslaughter in that the
doctrine may shield the company from liability when the breach is committed
by an employee who cannot be defined as a DM. The application of the
identification doctrine is imperative in common law because vicarious
liability does not apply to MCN.114
3. Criminal Breach of a Duty of Care by Companies Applying
Identification Doctrine
Lord Blackburn in The Pharmaceutical Society v. London and
Provincial Supply Association Ltd. expressed the view in 1880 that “. . . a
corporation cannot, in one sense, commit a crime—a corporation cannot be
imprisoned . . . .”115 Corporations, as an abstraction and artificial entity,
cannot commit any offence without using the hands and minds of humans;

110

DPP v. Newbury and Jones [1976] AC 500 (HL) 504.
The Queen v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67, ¶ 14.
112
PAGALLO, supra note 13, at 71.
113
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass [1972] AC 153 (HL) 170.
114
R v AC Hatrick Chemicals (1995) 152 A Crim R 384. See also REDMOND, supra note 33, at
215–16.
115
(1880) 5 App. Cas. 857 (HL) 861.
111
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they are absolutely dependent upon human agents for their business
operations. So a corporation can be liable when humans’ conduct is attributed
to it. Out of the numerous people that work for a large corporation, some
individuals may be regarded as the DM whilst others are treated merely as
hands of the entity.116 In Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v.
Securities Commission, Lord Hoffman quoted Denning LJ from Bolton
(Engineering) Co. Ltd. v. Graham & Sons Ltd. to compare a company to a
human body; namely, he stated that a company “has a brain and nerve centre
which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in
accordance with the direction from the centre.”117 A corporation can be held
liable for both categories of people behind it—the DM makes the entity
primarily liable, while secondary or vicarious liability is levied on the
artificial person under the premise of respondeat superior118 when its hands
(employees other than the DM) commit a wrong in acting within the scope
of employment but going beyond the directions of the DM. In spite of the
fact that vicarious liability can arise generally from breaches of civil law
(torts, contract), common law does not impose such a secondary liability for
manslaughter offences—119 though statutes can ascribe such liability on
corporations regardless of whether those individuals were authorised to do
that act, which is unrelated to this research.120 Lord Raymond CJ, in
acquitting the corporation from a homicide charge in R v. Huggins, ruled that
“[h]e only is criminally punishable, who immediately does the act, or permits
it to be done.”121 Also, the NSW Court of Appeal held that corporations will
not be exposed to vicarious liability for a MCN charge.122 Although MCN
does not require mens rea as decided in Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2
of 1999),123 gross and wicked negligence is sometimes regarded as the mental

116
MARKUS DUBBER & TATJANA HÖRNLE, CRIMINAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 331
(Oxford Univ. Press 2014).
117
(1995) 2 AC 500 (PC) 509 (Eng.).
118
Lord Reid stated the rule in these two words in Staveley Iron & Chemical Co. v. Jones [1956]
AC 627 (HL) 643.
119
However, employees’ unlawful conduct can form the basis of vicarious corporate criminal
liability in the United States. PINTO & EVANS, supra note 17, at 17.
120
See PINTO & EVANS, supra note 17, at 17; REDMOND, supra note 33, at 215–16.
121
(1730) 2 Str 883, 885.
122
See Presidential Security Services in Australia Pty Ltd v Brilley (2008) 67 ACSR 692.
123
(2000) 2 All ER 182.
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or fault element of the offence.124 MCN is an offence of general intent where
the accused intended to commit the act in question without having an
intention to cause a specific consequence such as death, and when the issue
of liability arises in relation to a crime of intent, the intention of its DM is
imputed to the corporation.125
The act of a corporation, rather than that of its employees, is determined
by applying the identification doctrine espoused by the House of Lords in
Lennard’s Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd.126 The acts of
certain employees of a company can be regarded as being the acts of the
entity itself, hence the company can be held directly or primarily, as opposed
to vicariously, liable for those acts.127 Regarding attribution of managing
director’s conduct to the company, the House of Lords in Lennard’s Carrying
Co. rejected the argument that the director’s fault could not be that of the
company itself.128 Hence, the director’s conduct was imputed to the company
as the conduct of DM.
The House of Lords analysed and applied the identification doctrine in
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass,129 which established that this doctrine
can be applied to all corporate offences excluding those of vicarious liability.
The identification doctrine applies to cases where the defendant corporation
can be convicted based on “the proof of mens rea provided that the natural
person who committed the actus reus of the offence could be identified with
the corporation” as its DM.130 The HCA confirmed in Hamilton v Whitehead
that the common law identification theory applies in Australia.131
The application of the doctrine of identification requires the
determination of two things: first, to identify the person who has committed
the wrongful act, and second, to determine whether that person “can be said
to embody the company’s mind and will.”132 So, in the application of this

124

C.C. Turpin, Mens Rea in Manslaughter, 20(2) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 200, 207 (1962).
DUBBER & HÖRNLE, supra note 116, at 331.
126
[1915] AC 705 (HL).
127
See the following English cases: DPP v. Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd. [1944] 1 KB 146; R
v. ICR Haulage Co. Ltd. [1944] KB at 551; and Moore v. I. Bresler Ltd. [1944] 2 All ER 515. For further
details, see PINTO & EVANS, supra note 17, at 35–39.
128
[1915] AC 705 (HL).
129
[1972] AC 153 (HL) 153.
130
PINTO & EVANS, supra note 17, at 42.
131
(1988) 166 CLR 121.
132
James Gobert, Corporate Criminality: Four Models of Fault, 14 LEGAL STUD. 393, 395 (1994).
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doctrine, the conduct of the natural person who embodies the company must
be identified and only his/her conduct can be attributed to the company,
which cannot be convicted alone without corresponding conviction of that
natural person.133 A single individual, or more than one person acting
collectively, such as a board of directors, can be identified as the DM for the
purpose of fault element.134
Regarding DM eligibility, the House of Lords in Tesco Supermarkets
Ltd. indicated that only a member of the board of directors can make a
corporation criminally liable as its DM.135 In declaring that a store manager
was not a DM, the House of Lords held that attachment of corporate liability
to an act of a person requires that “[t]he person who acts is not speaking or
acting for the company. He is acting as the company and his mind, which
directs his acts is the mind of the company. If it is a guilty mind then that
guilt is the guilt of the company [emphasis added].”136 While considering the
appropriate form of mens rea for culpable homicide, “both Lords Hamilton
and Osborne went on to conclude that such mens rea may only be brought
home to a corporate body by means of the identification principle outlined in
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd.”137 The identification doctrine has been applied
more recently in Transco PLC v. Her Majesty’s Advocate, which reinforces
the importance of this doctrine.138 The English courts in the three leading
cases of 1944, discussed earlier, attributed the mens rea of senior executives
to their respective companies.139 The identification doctrine is applicable to
all common law crimes including MCN.140 However, the imputation of mens
rea of a senior executive of the company is essential to entity liability.
A further provision regarding omissions allows corporate prosecution
even without attribution. Companies can be prosecuted for omissions in two

133
PINTO & EVANS, supra note 17, at 51 (citing A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2002] 2 Cr App
R 207, 217).
134
James Chalmers, Corporate Culpable Homicide: Transco Plc v. HM Advocate, 8 EDINBURGH
L. REV. 262, 264 (2004).
135
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass [1972] AC 153 (HL) 170. See also PINTO & EVANS, supra
note 17, at 52.
136
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass [1972] AC 153 (HL) 170 per Lord Reid.
137
Chalmers, supra note 134, at 264.
138
[2004] SCCR 1, 4 (Scot.).
139
See DPP v. Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd. [1944] 1 KB 146; R v. ICR Haulage Co. Ltd.
[1944] KB 551; Moore v. I. Bresler Ltd. (1944) 22 All ER 515.
140
See PINTO & EVANS, supra note 17, at 42.
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ways. Firstly, the corporate liability for “omissions” is personal, as held by
the English Court of Appeal in R v. Gateway Foodmarkets Ltd.141 The same
approach was taken by the Court of Appeal in New Zealand in Linework Ltd.
v. Department of Labour, which held that the company itself may be said to
have failed to act, thereby failed to ensure workers’ safety in its own right,
so there is no need to attribute someone else’s failure.142 Secondly, the
liability for another person’s omission can be attributed to the company under
the theory of DM; however, the two routes are not mutually exclusive.143 An
action of any employee can be attributed to the company if it falls within the
scope of employment and direction of the DM.
The organic theory devised by the House of Lords in Tesco
Supermarkets Ltd v. Nattrass144 is widely disputed145 in that it makes
corporate conviction difficult due to the difficulty in determining the DM,
particularly in large corporations.146 Such complexity is evident in several
cases—for example, the Tesco case itself, and an Australian case of R v AC
Hatrick Chemicals Pty Ltd, in which the Supreme Court of Victoria ordered
an acquittal of the company from the manslaughter charge by accepting an
argument that the two employees (a plant engineer and plant manager) who
committed the wrongful act did not embody the guiding mind of the entity
and their conduct was not grossly negligent either.147 The identification of
the DM should be relatively easier in a small company than its larger
counterparts.148 The difficulty in the application of this doctrine to large
companies contributed to the enactment of the Corporate Manslaughter and
Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (UK), which has eased the requirement to

141
(1997) 3 All ER 78, 81–282 per Evans LJ. The appellant company was convicted in 1995 in the
Crown Court at Sheffield of an offence under §§ 2(1) and 33(a) of the Health and Safety at Work Act
1974 (UK) and the appeal against conviction was dismissed. R v. Gateway Foodmarkets Ltd. (1997) 3 All
ER 78, 81–282. See also R v. Birmingham & Cloucester Railway Co. [1842] 3 QB 223; Clough, supra
note 99, at 39–41.
142
[2001] 2 NZLR 639 at [25] per Blanchard J (N.Z.).
143
Id. at [43] per Tipping J.
144
[1972] AC 153 (HL).
145
See C. Wells, Corporate Criminal Liability: Developments in Europe and Beyond, 39(7) LAW
SOC’Y J. 62, 64 (2001).
146
Karen Wheelwright, Company Directors’ Liability for Workplace Deaths, 35(4) CRIM. L.J. 223,
225–26 (2011).
147
(1995) 152 A Crim R 384.
148
See Wheelwright, supra note 146, at 225–27.
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identify a DM.149 The enacted law has significantly contributed to an
increased conviction rate in the United Kingdom.150
With respect to machines like robots, legal scholars consider potential
specific failures including: “design defects, manufacturing defects,
information defects, and failures to instruct on appropriate uses.”151
Identifying the actor who basically commits the wrong is even more
complex, in that the designing, programming, coding, etc. will far exceed the
capability of a single individual.152 Although this is directly relevant to the
supply side, the defects and complexities of machines will affect the liability
of the user side as well. This is because such complexities will warrant giving
risk notifications to workers, arranging adequate training of robots’
operators, ensuring proper maintenance of IRs, carrying out appropriate
supervision of robots’ users, etc. So, a breach of the duty of care can be
established by proving a breach of any of these duties by the employer.
However, many of the individuals who will be entrusted with these tasks
might not be identified as a DM. Thus the complexity is clearly compounded
by the common law principle that a company cannot be vicariously liable for
MCN offences committed by employees other than those who constitute the
DM. If the DM was not at fault, corporations would evade liability
immediately although the death occurred due to the criminally negligent
conduct of an employee whose punishment may not be sufficient to achieve
the objectives of criminal justice. Nevertheless, the doctrine is adopted in
Australia and applied in NSW.153
To conclude, the organic theory makes the entity criminally liable only
if the delinquent natural person is regarded as the DM, and at the time of
committing the crime he/she had acted as the company, rather than for the
company. In other words, he/she embodied the company, which allows
attribution of the natural person’s knowledge and action or inaction to the
corporation. Then the negligence is legally considered to be the negligence

149
For discussions of the merits and flaws of this legislation, see Dorothy Farisani, Corporate
Homicide: What Can South Africa Learn from Recent Developments in English Law?, 42(2) COMP. &
INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 210 (2009); James Gobert, The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act
2007—Thirteen years in the making but was it worth the wait?, 71(3) MOD. L. REV. 413 (2008).
150
See FIELDFISHER, supra note 37.
151
David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89
WASH. L. REV. 117, 130 (2014).
152
PAGALLO, supra note 13, at 69.
153
See North Sydney Council v Roman (2007) 69 NSWLR 240, ¶ 28.
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of the company itself and it is to be established that the accused corporation
through that human agent had greatly fallen short of the standard of care of a
reasonable entity in the circumstances in which the wrongful conduct was
committed. In the case of IRs, both corporations (employers) and their senior
executives can be found to have breached the duty where the breach will be
committed by a DM, otherwise the liability will be limited to the wrongdoing
individuals who cannot be regarded as DM, whose conduct cannot be
attributed to the company. Moreover, the criminal breach at hand
fundamentally depends on whether conduct represents the required high
degree of negligence. A successful finding of breach will call for the causal
link between the negligent conduct and the death occurred as a consequence.
The following section considers the doctrine of causation.
4. Proving Causation of Death
The breach of a duty of care will not attract punishment unless it is
proved that the death in question was caused by an act or omission of the
accused constituting the breach. The courts in Justins v R154 and Lane v R155
held that it is imperative that the accused’s negligent conduct causes death of
the deceased.156 However, in some cases it may not become irrefutably
evident that the accused’s conduct caused the death. In those cases, the law
does provide a solution to such an ambiguity. Common law principles
governing causation stipulate that the accused’s negligent conduct must be
one of the causes of the victim’s death and need not be the sole cause.157 As
decided by the NSWCCA in R v Andrew, it is not even necessary to prove
that the accused’s act was the principal cause.158 Whether a certain act caused
the death of the deceased is a question of fact,159 and so is the identification
of the act causing death as held by the NSWCCA in R v Katarzynski.160 If
more than one life-threatening cause is found in relation to the victim’s death,

154

(2010) 79 NSWLR 544, ¶ 97 (Austl.).
(2013) 241 A Crim R 321, ¶ 61 (Austl.).
156
See also Burns v The Queen (2012) 246 CLR 334, ¶ 20 per French CJ (Austl.).
157
R v. Pagett (1983) 76 Cr. App. R. 279, 288 (UK).
158
[2000] NSWCCA 310, ¶ 60.
159
Id.
160
[2005] NSWCCA 72, ¶ 17. See also id. ¶ 18 (describing the right direction to the jury on this
155

issue).
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consideration should be given to the determination of whether the accused’s
negligent conduct was an “operating and substantial” cause of the death.161
The disputed conduct must be “something more than de minimis,”162
However, it need not be a major cause.163 If a breach in the chain of causation
is found, the conduct of the accused can still be regarded as satisfying the
requirement of being an operating and substantial cause where: “[i]t seems
to the court that if at the time of death the original wound is still an operating
cause and a substantial cause, then the death can properly be said to be the
result of the wound.”164 Notably, “robots do not break the traditional chain
of causation as long as these machines are not understood as proper legal
persons that can interrupt the causal link between the original agency and the
harmful outcome of a chain of events.”165 To prove causation, the “but for
test” is considered to be a ground rule which lays down that the death would
not have occurred but for the presence of the disputed conduct of the
accused.166
This rule has its critics and its notion may seem ridiculously broad.167
However, in practice, courts distinguish between but-for causation and legal
causation, and in doing so, they consider whether the accused’s negligent
conduct was a cause (legal causation), instead of looking for all of the
potential causes of a given consequence.168 The HCA in Royall v R
pronounced that the purpose of the doctrine of causation “is to attribute legal
responsibility, not to determine the factors which played a part in the
happening of an event or an occurrence.”169
Similar to the determination of breach of duty, the objective test is
applied to ascertain whether the accused’s conduct was a cause.170 So, the
trier of fact—the jury or the judge in the absence of a jury system—shall

161

R v Lam & Ors (2008) 185 A Crim R 453, ¶¶ 64–65 (Austl.); R v Hallett [1969] SASR 141, 149

(Austl.).
162

R v. Hennigan (1971) 55 Cr. App. R. 262, 264–65.
R v. Pagett (1983) 76 Cr. App. R. 279, 288 (UK).
164
R v. Smith (1959) 2 QB 35, 42–43.
165
PAGALLO, supra note 13, at 75.
166
BROWN ET AL., supra note 36, at 159.
167
See DENNIS J. BAKER, GLANVILLE WILLIAMS TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 197 (3d ed. 2012).
168
BROWN ET AL., supra note 36, at 159.
169
(1991) 172 CLR 378, 412.
170
Id.; see also Gavin Ruddy, R v Southampton and Fatal Medical Negligence: An Anomaly or a
Sign of Things to Come?, 1 PLYMOUTH L. REV. 81 (2010).
163
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decide if the accused’s conduct was a legal or a substantial cause of the
victim’s death.171 A manslaughter conviction should be awarded once the
legal causation is objectively proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Assumedly, legal causation in IRs related cases can be proved without
much of a hurdle, in that the attack would generally be serious and visible.
However, the “Gordian knot” may arise in some instances, particularly in
finding out the reason why the robot had attacked the victim in a
circumstance where the employer duly performed its duties. In a case where
the required gross negligence of the user side cannot be found, the employer
can be sued for simple negligence pursuant to a civil remedy claim. If no
negligence on the user side can be found, the manufacturer will have to take
the responsibility in a products liability case, and the manufacturer, on its
own initiative, will then identify the persons whose fault made the machine
defective.172 Simultaneously, the employer must arrange insurance coverage
for its employees.
The liability on both sides of errant robots can be justified by relying on
the policy reasons, which state that persons injured, through no fault of their
own, should receive redress; similarly, one who benefits from a business
should pay; and further, predictable liability risks stimulate innovations.173
Therefore, the potential liability should be considered against both sides of
the spectrum; however the criminal liability of the supply side has been
placed outside the scope of this Article. Now, an obvious question arises as
to who should go on trial first.
IV. PERSONS WHO SHOULD GO ON TRIAL
More than one person may be held liable for an offence of MCN in a
single suit.174 Hence, legally, both the employer-company and its individual
officers, including supervisors, can be held liable. When the company itself
will be held liable for manslaughter, which is a primary liability under
common law, the liability of the wrongdoing officer(s) of the company will

171
Krakouer v Western Australia [2006] WASCA 81; R v. Pagett [1983] 76 Cr. App. R. 279 (UK),
as cited in Royall v R (1991) 172 CLR 378, 411 (Austl.).
172
See Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
173
For details, see Vladeck, supra note 151, at 130.
174
Royall v R (1991) 172 CLR 378, 411 (Austl.).
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be accessorial for aiding or abetting the company’s crime.175 In a case where
the individual whose negligence will be found to have been an operating and
substantial cause of the deceased’s demise, but he/she cannot be identified as
the DM, that individual will be personally liable, and the company will
escape liability because vicarious liability provisions do not apply to
common law manslaughter. In the context of robots in particular, Pagallo
argues that “when humans reasonably fail to guard against foreseeable harms
as provoked by robots, individuals are to be held responsible even when they
had no intent to commit the wrong.”176 These general common law principles
apply to individuals, and reaching a judicial decision on their direct liability
would be relatively easier compared to the liability of the company.
Since our discussion is focused on workplace safety, we recommend
that the employer who bears the primary responsibility to ensure safety of its
employees should be sued initially. The employer’s liability refers to the
liability of the entity and its executives. However, the general common law
principles and the organic theory discussed earlier will apply.
The employer’s liability can be conveniently established in some
instances—for example, when the manufacturer has provided adequate
warning and instructions regarding safety measures, but the victim’s
employer has ignored those instructions, it may be possible to show that the
employer acted with gross and wicked negligence by exposing its employees
to a high risk of death or grievous bodily harm. This may also happen when
the manufacturer has made certain disclosures—for example, if the operator
of the machine needed training in order to avoid potential danger, but the
employer did not allow him/her to undertake the essential training or organise
such training before asking the employee to make use of it.177 In such a case,
both the employer-company and the negligent individuals can potentially be
held liable. As mentioned previously, an employer can be held liable for both

175
R v Goodall (1975) 11 SASR 94 (Austl.); Hamilton v Whitehead (1988) 166 CLR 121 (Austl.).
For a discussion of this accessorial liability, see S.M. Solaiman & Lars Bo Langsted, Crimes Committed
by Directors Attributed to Corporations—Why Should Directors be Accessory?: Viewing Through the
Complicity Rules in Common Law, 28 CRIM. L.F. (forthcoming 2017).
176
PAGALLO, supra note 13, at 72.
177
The employer does have a positive duty to impart adequate training to its employees. Vladeck,
supra note 151, at 140.
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overt and covert failures,178 which include insufficient training, and
inadequate supervision.179
Workplace safety is subject to both the OHS legislation as well as
criminal law in NSW. The Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (WHSA 2011)
governs the regulatory offences concerning OHS in NSW. Sections 27 to 29
of WHSA 2011 impose statutory duties on several persons, including the
business organisations and their workforce (including officers), to do all that
is reasonably practicable to ensure a safe and healthy work environment.
Central to all these duties is to take reasonable care to protect oneself and
others at work. The officers of an employer have a duty to “exercise due
diligence to ensure that the person conducting the business or undertaking
complies with that duty or obligation.”180 Notably, the legislation does not
contain any provisions for manslaughter. However, in the event of death
occurring at work or being caused by workplace injuries, two alternatives
remain open: bringing a criminal charge under the WHSA 2011 for a
regulatory offence, or a manslaughter charge under the Crimes Act 1900
(NSW), including common law.181 The health and safety regulator and the
police will jointly decide the appropriate action, and either invoke the WHSA
2011 or the criminal law against the wrongdoers.182
It is now obvious, not only under the common law principles, but under
statutory law, that the employer and its officers have a duty of care to protect
workers, and workers also have a duty to protect themselves. The
prosecution’s responsibility in such a workplace safety case of MCN should
be limited to establishing the elements of the offence analysed above.
Although, the common law defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact
does not apply to this offence,183 fairness in ascribing criminal liability, as
discussed in this Article, lies in the fact that it is neither absolute nor strict
liability. Rather, one can be convicted only if gross or wicked negligence

178

See Wells et al., supra note 91, at 499–501.
REASON, supra note 92.
180
Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW) s 27(1).
181
The Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 18 defines murder and just mentions that all other unlawful
homicides are manslaughter. Thus manslaughter is defined in common law. However, The Crimes Act
1900 (NSW) s 24 provides for penalties of manslaughter.
182
Wheelwright, supra note 146, at 35.
183
R v Wilson (1992) 174 CLR 313; see also The Queen v Lavender (2005) 222 CLR 67, ¶¶ 57–
60.
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causing the victim’s death is proved beyond reasonable doubt, by applying
an objective test which embraces several personal attributes of the accused.
In the event of a prosecutorial failure in proving the elements of
manslaughter—for example, in a case in which the employer was negligent,
but not grossly or wickedly negligent—then the issue has to be dealt with
under the OHS legislation and other civil law provisions.
If the machines are found to be faulty, the employer should take the
responsibility to sue the manufacturer under tort or contract law.
Manufacturers do have a positive duty to make their products safe. In holding
an auto manufacturer liable for defective design and construction, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit pronounced that “a
manufacturer’s duty of design and construction extends to producing a
product that is reasonably fit for its intended use and free of hidden defects
that could render it unsafe for such use, the issue narrows on the proper
interpretation of ‘intended use.’”184
If no negligence or fault is found on any side, the accident should be
deemed to be simply a malfunction of the sophisticated machine causing an
accidental death, and it should be brought within the insurance coverage.185
V. CONCLUSIONS
Manufacturing industries have been using robots in today’s world with
a trend towards an exponential surge in the usage of such machines in future.
They are producing both benefit and harm, the latter of which ranges from
bodily harm to death of humans. Time is ripe to ascertain the persons who
should be held liable for such irreparable losses in order to minimise them so
far as it is possible to do so. Based upon the preceding discussion of
manslaughter liability in NSW, it is evident that finding the true culprit of a
workplace death inflicted by an IR may not be always an easy task because
of the complex and sophisticated nature of the machine.

184

Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
For details about the remedy and apportionment thereof, see Vladeck, supra note 151, at 130. If
no fault or negligence can be found on the part of anyone, meanwhile the machine malfunctioned and
killed a person, no one may be held liable. For detail, see Curtis E.A. Karnow, Liability for Distributed
Artificial Intelligence, 11 BERKELEY TECH. & L.J 147 (1996).
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It is now, however, judicially recognised that “robots cannot be sued,”
even though “they can cause devastating damage.”186 Accordingly, we regard
robots as objects rather than subjects of law. We have briefly negated the
need for separate personality of robots for the purposes of criminal liability
at this stage, and have argued that both humans and corporations involved in
the user side and/or the supply side of such machines should take the
responsibility for such deaths. In so doing, we have analysed the common
law constituent elements of manslaughter as they apply in Australia.187 It
would be difficult to prove guilt against the corporation owing to the burden
of proof regarding the entity’s DM under the common law organic theory.
This difficulty relates mostly to the proof of a critical element of MCN being
breach of the duty of care by an individual who must have acted as the
company, rather than for the company, as the theory requires the prosecution
to prove in order to convict a company. Other requirements of a MCN are:
the existence of a duty of care, grossly and wickedly negligent conduct of a
human being constituting a breach of the duty of care, and a causal link
between death and the negligent conduct. These three factors are considered
in light of the conduct of human beings who cause the breach in dispute.
The general findings in this article are that persons who should be tried
for manslaughter include the employer corporation, its senior executives,
supervisors, and other individuals who had a link to the operation of robots.
Of course, the conviction of any individuals should be based on the proof of
personal fault, or the required high degree of negligence. If only simple
negligence is found, the employer should be held liable under OHS
legislation and/or civil law provisions as applicable to the facts. In a case of
defective machine, the employer should take the responsibility to sue the
manufacturer and recover adequate compensation for the victim’s family in
addition to any available compensation to be paid by the employer.
Generally, manufacturers are primarily liable to the consumers for defective
products, but IRs are purchased by factories and operated by their employees
who are entitled to have a well-protected work environment from their
employer.

186
See United States v. Athlone Indus. Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 979 (3d Cir. 1984), as cited in Vladeck,
supra note 151, at 124.
187
Common law principles are uniform across Australian jurisdictions unless legislation of any
particular jurisdiction provides otherwise.
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As we have argued regarding the manslaughter liability of a corporation,
it is an established fact that the common law identification doctrine is an
obstacle to corporate conviction. It has led to the codification of corporate
manslaughter law in the United Kingdom in 2007 and has resulted in a
significant rise in the conviction rate.188 A comprehensive study released in
November 2014 by Safe Work Australia, an independent statutory agency,
found at least 639 work-related fatalities had occurred during 2006-2011
across the country.189 More recently, there were 118 notable workplace
fatalities in just Australia from January to August 2015.190 The prevailing
criminal law plays only a limited role in deterring this serious offence and
punishing corporate directors who are directly involved in such losses of
lives.191 The need for corporate manslaughter legislation has been advocated
by many in the past in Australia.192 For example, in 2005 a private member
bill was tabled in the NSW Parliament in order to create a corporate
manslaughter crime with a fine of $5 million penalty to the corporation and
a maximum of 5 years imprisonment to individuals whose conduct would
constitute the crime.193 This proposal to amend the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
did not succeed.194 The Australian Capital Territory has already introduced
industrial manslaughter legislation that is now incorporated in its general
criminal law.195 This Article reiterates the need for corporate manslaughter
legislation given the potential severity of robotic malfunctions and the

188

FIELDFISHER, supra note 37.
SAFE WORK AUSTRALIA, WORK-RELATED FATALITIES ASSOCIATED WITH UNSAFE DESIGN OF
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See Des Taylor & Geraldine Mackenzie, Staying Focused on the Big Picture: Should Australia
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.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Hansard/Pages/HansardResult.aspx#/docid/HANSARD-1820781676-65134.
195
Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) Amendment Act 2003 pt 2A ss 49A–49E (Austl.).
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complexity of the organic theory. The WHSA 2011 (NSW) does not include
manslaughter provision, and the common law provision has a very limited
success in prosecuting corporate manslaughter. Thus, it is anticipated that
robot-provoked workplace deaths will go unpunished. Punishing workplace
deaths caused by criminally negligent conduct under manslaughter law is
widely believed to be a critical legal response to the problem.196 Conviction
for workplace deaths under the OHS legislation as a regulatory offence does
not mirror the moral denounce to the same degree as it does when convicted
of manslaughter under criminal law.197 Notably, fines, being a common
punishment of regulatory offences, alone do not work as a deterrent penalty
in OHS as observed by Pritchard,198 and corporations consider pecuniary
penalties as part of doing business.199
There is no denying the fact that finding the truly blameworthy person
in a trial of MCN perpetrated by a robot would be sometimes a difficult task
due to inherent scientific uncertainty as to the reason of the machine’s
malfunction. However, it does not mean that such a serious harm should be
ignored by arguing that regulation may hold back innovation.200 The opposite
and perhaps more logical view is that “a predictable liability regime may
better spur innovation.”201
Deterrence is the most appropriate theory for crimes involving
negligence.202 A 1998 United Kingdom study on health and safety executives
revealed that most of the workplace deaths were avoidable and they occurred
due to lack of simple planning and precautions.203 Perhaps most alarmingly,
the study unveiled that 70% of 739 deaths investigated over a period of four
years could have been avoided if management had taken appropriate
precautionary measures.204 We must not wait for more deaths to occur before
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making a move to make laws for the prevention and punishment of such a
serious offence; rather, we need to accept that sooner is better. Special
circumstances warrant special legal treatment at all times and in all societies,
and it cannot be ignored that IRs have already created that exceptional case
worldwide which necessitates appropriate law in NSW that can set forth a
good example for others around the world. If we ignore the safety concern
today, we will have to submit ourselves to the desire of robots at some point,
and then an obvious question shall arise: “should we ever end up in a world
ruled by robots?”205

205

Bertolini, supra note 9, at 214–16.
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